GOVERNMENT officials refer to it blandly as the SSE, or Sensitive Site Exploitation. That’s their oblique term for the extraordinary cache of evidence that was carried away from Osama bin Laden’s compound the night the al-Qa’ida leader was killed.
With the anniversary of the September 11, 2001, attacks two weeks away, it’s possible to use this evidence to sketch a vivid portrait of al-Qa’ida, drawing on material contained in more than 100 computer storage devices, including thumb drives, DVDs and CDs, and more than a dozen computers or hard drives – all collected during the May 2 raid.
US officials say three strong themes emerge from their reading of the files, most of which were communications between bin Laden and his top deputy, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman. Indeed, because the Libyan-born Atiyah was the boss’s key link with the outside, officials see him as more important than bin Laden’s nominal successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
*Bin Laden retained until his death a passion to launch a significant attack against the US, ideally linked to the 10th anniversary of 9/11. He and Atiyah communicated often about who might carry out such a strike, with Atiyah proposing names and bin Laden rejecting them. Bin Laden was still looking for a history-changing attack on big, economically important targets – one that would match, if not outdo, the impact of 9/11. Zawahiri, by contrast, favoured an opportunistic strategy of smaller strikes.
*Bin Laden was a hands-on chief executive officer, with a role in operations planning and personnel decisions, rather than the detached senior leader that US analysts had hypothesised. Zawahiri, whom the analysts had imagined as the day-to-day leader, was actually quite isolated – and remains so, despite a dozen communications this year. Zawahiri suffers from mistrust between his Egyptian faction of al-Qa’ida and other operatives, such as Atiyah.
*Bin Laden was suffering badly from drone attacks on al-Qa’ida’s base in the tribal areas of Pakistan. He called this the “intelligence war”, and said it was “the only weapon that’s hurting us”. His cadres complained that they couldn’t train in the tribal areas, couldn’t communicate, couldn’t travel easily and couldn’t draw new recruits to what amounted to a free-fire zone. Bin Laden discussed moving al-Qa’ida’s base to another location, but he never took action.
Analysts did not find in the material any smoking gun to suggest Pakistani government complicity in bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad. And it’s clear he was paranoid about being found and killed. He ordered his men to restrict movements to help preserve what remained of al-Qa’ida in Pakistan. Fear of being discovered was a subject of regular conversation between Bin Laden, Atiyah, Zawahiri and others.
Bin Laden worried that al-Qa’ida’s status among Muslims was dwindling, and that the West had partially succeeded in distancing al-Qa’ida’s message from Islamic values. He counselled affiliates in North Africa and Yemen to hold back on their efforts to develop a local Islamic extremist state in favour of attacking the US and its interests.
This fear that al-Qa’ida’s tactics were alienating Muslims was also the theme of a message that Atiyah sent in 2005 to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the murderous chief of al-Qa’ida in Iraq. Atiyah warned that fomenting Sunni-Shiite violence, a Zarqawi trademark, was potentially ruinous.
The al-Qa’ida that emerges from these documents is a battered and disoriented group. The June 3 death of Ilyas Kashmiri in a drone attack illustrates the organisation’s continuing vulnerability. Kashmiri was a ruthless operator who planned the 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed 166 people and was plotting attacks on Europe last winter that were stopped only because of aggressive counter-terrorism work.
When top US officials summarise their view of al-Qa’ida, they describe an organisation that is down but certainly not out. They don’t know of any specific plots targeting the US, 10 years on. But they’re looking, pulsing every channel they know. They recognise that it’s what we still don’t know about al-Qa’ida that’s most dangerous.
August 28, 2011
Categories: World . Tags: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Al-Qaeda, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Leon Panetta, Official, Osama bin Laden, Pakistan . Author: news4pk . Comments: 1 Comment